After the Tory electoral victory in 1979, energy produced by nuclear power was high on the agenda. Energy secretary David Howell argued that nuclear power was essential to the nations energy needs, and equally important, he said: "It would have the advantage of removing a substantial proportion of electricity production from the dangers of disruption by industrial action"

In Feb 1981 D. Howell, energy secretary, was forced to back down on the issue of pit closures when 23 pits were threatened and coal stocks were not too high. But that was a tactical withdrawal. From then on in 1981 preparations were made to ensure the Government would not withdraw next time.

A special committee was appointed to consider the question of energy supplies and coal stocks, also a committee to deal with the protection of civil order, and supplies during an industrial dispute, plus plans for the policing of any major industrial disruption. N.C.B. area directors, and C.E.G.B.s regional chairmen, were instructed to begin a process of stockpiling as a policy, at the cost of £400 million. There was an instruction by the new energy secretary, Nigel Lawson, to the C.E.G.B. asking the electricity industry to save on coal and burn more oil, despite the grater cost and the adverse effect on the balance of payments.

Plans were also made for the importation of coal, plus stocks acquired in European ports. Transport haulage firms were encouraged to recruit non-union drivers to drive through picket lines for a handsome bonus. Preparations were made to cut off welfare benefits to strikers and their families.

Some received £10 to £12 benefits per week to live on; similar couples not on strike would be getting £48.25 per week, the official government poverty line. There were men in jail for rape, robbery and murder, whose families were better off than striking miners. A law had been passed whereby £15 was deducted from benefits of striker's families, the amount deemed as strike pay. Even though every one new full well, that the miners got nothing, and indeed the union's funds were soon to be sequestrated anyway. A large mobile squad of specially trained police was formed to deal with any disorder.

Ian Macgregor

Other aspects of preparation were the appointment of people in the nationalised industries that were more sympathetic with Government objectives. Sir Walter Marshall who was a great supporter of nuclear power replaced C.E.G.B. chairman Glyn England. Ian Macgregor, who saw great virtues in tough Victorian style managerial authority, was made chairman of the N.C.B. He had already dealt a knock out blow to the steel workers union in a 13-week strike in 1980.

He also had a good track record in the U.S. for his anti-unionism and his job was to cut the industry down to an economic size, bring the N.U.M. under control and reshape the coal board management.

This was part of a preparation package for eventual privatization.
There was also preparation by the police. Police training methods were changed and modernised. There was a concept of using the police far more actively as a national body in times of industrial strife. The National Reporting Center established its own separate premises at Scotland Yard and was managed by the Association of Chief Police Officers. The N.R.C. was fully equipped at Scotland Yard to co-ordinate police cover and operations throughout all mining areas. The Police were also singled out for pay increases well beyond the general norm.

Another major factor was the Thatcher - Macgregor link during the dispute, which was always denied, but the Dept of Energy often complained about the Coal Board Chairman by-passing the formal channels of communications through them, and going direct to Downing Street. Macgregor told close associates his role was to cut the industry down to economic size, take on A. Scargill, and demonstrate what tough management could do in a Nationalised industry, when it was determined and single minded.

He has since revealed the whole operation against the N.U.M. was simply an exercise in timing. The timing of the strike was hardly one that the N.U.M. would have chosen willingly.

1. Coal stocks were at a record high level.
2. Winter was at an end.
3. Power Stations and industry had secure supplies.
4. There was uncertainty within the ranks of the N.U.M
5. The government was well prepared.