CRIGGLESTON. Wakefield, Yorkshire. 29th July 1941

The inquiry into the causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at Criggleston Colliery, Yorkshire on the 29th. July 1941, was conducted by H.J. Humphrys, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines. The inquiry was conducted alongside the inquest which was held by Mr. C.J. Haworth, one of H.M. Coroners for the West Riding of Yorkshire who sat without a jury. All interested parties were represented.

The court found that:-
“The men died as the result of extensive burns or injuries and carbon monoxide poisoning following an explosion of firedamp and that they met their deaths by misadventure.”

The report was presented to Mr. D.R. Grenfell, Esq., C.B.E., J.P., M.P. Secretary for Mines on the 3rd November 1941. The proceedings occupied seven days and 21 witnesses were called to identify the victims and evidence was taken from 27 witnesses about the events of the disaster.

Three workmen who survived the explosion gave evidence. One could remember nothing about the events, another knew of nothing unusual during the shift and the third was working at the coal cutter on the South Face. He said that there was little firedamp at the face ripping lip of the South Loader gate which he mentioned to a deputy. He also stated that the machineman in charge carried a flame safety lamp which was hung up on the Loader gate for the whole of the shift.

The question as to the presence of firedamp was examined and directed to see if there was any truth in the rumours that there was gas present in the district before the explosion but it was not established that gas had been found except on two occasions and in small quantities. There was evidence from the deputies that they saw a feeder of gas a few feet from the face and the point of issue moved forwards as the face advanced. A belt breaker on the South Face was in the district two hours before the explosion and he smelt firedamp in the South Timber Gate 9 or 10 yards from the ripping edge but he did not report this to anyone and the day shift deputy found none and a half percent in the South Side at 6.25 a.m. He fixed a hurdle sheet and the gas cleared but he did not record this in the book which was a breach of No.7 of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1938. There were no automatic gas detectors issued on the shift and on the day of the explosion nine flame were issued in the whole pit.

The ventilation of the district was regarded as insufficient by H.M. Inspectors as there were leakages through the sheets. The opinion was expressed by several witnesses that firedamp accumulated in the cavities formed above the roof level during the settlement of the beds above the seam and Dr. D.W. Phillips of the Safety in Mines Research Board explained how the gas could be forced through breaks in the roof into the South Loader and the South Timber gate sand along the fault sides.

Mr. Humphrys summed up the evidence and said:-
“In my opinion the firedamp was ignited in a break by a ripping shot fired in the South Loader gate two and a half hours prior to the explosion and it continued to burn unseen until contact was made by the flame with an explosive mixture.”

Mr. Humphrys made the following recommendations:-
1. That the statutory regulations as to the supply of flame lamps or detectors should be rigidly complied with everywhere, particularly where the workings were electrified and intensively worked.

2. That overmen, deputies or others, should carry out the requirements as to reporting impurities in the air.

3. Leakages should be tightened up, and additional doors provided where necessary.

4. The system of packing should receive every consideration, especially in view of Dr. Phillip’s evidence.

5. That every explosion however small - even if no one is hurt - should be treated as a matter of major importance.

6. Every precaution should be taken by management and men to see that all regulations are enforced.”