Edge Green
Ashton-in-Makerfield, Lancashire. 12th November, 1932

With the accumulation of firedamp on the No.12 Level was ignited there would be a train of flame right back to the point from which it was emerging and coal dust would be stirred up partially consumed resulting in the production of the deadly carbon monoxide gas. George Dallimore alone of the 26 persons in this part of the No.5 Brow escaped and he owed his escape to the fact that at the moment he was working in the intake air at the entrance to the district.

The flame died out on the No.12 Level in an outbye direction namely owing to the release afforded by the openings to the left and right up and down No.7 Brow and the presence of stone dust prevented the burning of coal dust.

On the inbye sides of the No.8 Brow there were openings left and right up and down No.9 Brow but that part and all parts inbye had not been dusted with stone and the coal dust prevalent in those parts and especially prevalent because the workings were ‘broken’ workings would and did extend the area over which the flame spread.

The second explosion was due to a fire left as a result of the first and that fire was in the shunt in No 12 level and to have been extinguished by a heavy fall which was found later in that shunt. It will be remembered that in his evidence Hesketh described he appearance of the atmosphere at the outbye end of the No.12 Level after the first explosion as being like mist, whereas he Daly and Duffy were near the entrance to that level some time later before the second explosion occurred they describe the atmosphere emerging fro that level at that time as black fumes with a peculiar smell as something burning.

The two doors on the No.5 Brow were blown open by the first explosion and remained open after Quinn and Hesketh soon after the explosion had passed through then when on their way to the No.5 Brow. Later they were closed by Duffy, Daly and Hesketh and a second explosion occurred within a few minutes there after. It may be, as was suggested by Mr. Coatesworth and probably was the fact that the second explosion was hastened by the closing of these two doors. It was certain that if they had been blown open by the first explosion and remained open and so allowed fresh air to go direct down No.5 Brow and into No.2 Brow the men in that district would all have been killed by the carbon monoxide in the afterdamp carried on to them. As it was they had a narrow escape.

The Official Report began by commenting on the conditions in the colliery before the explosion. The scheme of ventilation was bad and it was recognised that the manger evidently recognised that this was the case.
Long before the working out of the pillars was begun, Mr. Latham had started to make preparations with a view to an alteration.

The Inspector of Mines commented -
“It was unfortunate that he did not press on with the work. It could have been completed long before the removal of the pillars formed. In the stret work began and it is surprising that when firedamp began to give trouble he did not then immediately complete his scheme it is also surprising that the Agent, Mr. Whitehead id not press him to do so instead of telling him, as he did to put more brattices across No.12 Level.”

The new scheme would have given each district it’s own air supply and have got rid of the several doors erected on the haulage brows. The air current at the time of the explosion had to find it’s way as best it could along the edge of the goaf which was always a dangerous practice. The travelable airways should have been kept open either by the use of chocks or stone buildings.

It would have been wise for Mr. Whitehead and Mr. Latham to have taken Mr. Charlton into their confidence when they found themselves in difficulties they should have either have gone to see him or asked him to visit the colliery to discuss the position. If they had done so the advice which Mr. Charlton with his long experience could have given then would have been of great value.

On this point, Mr. Walker commented -
“On many occasions I have tried to impress upon those in charge of the working of mines that when in difficulty their proper course was to take the Inspectors into their confidence to put their troubles clearly before them and to ask for their help."

The Inspectors are at all times anxious to be of assistance and especially in times of their difficulties.”
The signalling system came under great scrutiny at the inquiry. It was found to be unsafe in the presence of firedamp. It could be thought that the No.5 Brow on the inbye side of the doors of the No.12 Level were not parts of the mine in which inflammable gas, was likely to occur in quantity sufficient to be dangerous and that the General Regulations did not apply, but this could not be the case in regard to the foot on No 8 brow.
The position does not seem to have been understood. The system in use had been described, two conductors one insulated and one bare, pushes and bells which were thought to be flameproof and batteries of Leclanche cells. Had the bells and pushes been flameproof and maintained in that condition and had signals been given by means only of bell pushes, then the system was safe. But the bells and pushes, even if they were flameproof when new, were not maintained in that condition and signals, in view of the numerous bare places on the insulated conductor, obviously were used other than by using the bell-pushes. The bells themselves were not safe. They were of such construction that the spark given when the circuit was made and then broken, was capable of igniting firedamp.

It had not been realised that to ensure safety under all conditions when using electric bells, the bells themselves must be of such construction, that the spark given at any point within the bell should have been incapable of igniting firedamp.

Many types of bell were available which had been tested and certified by the Mines Department as safe. Their safety was achieved by incorporating a device which absorbed part of the energy which otherwise would be released on breaking the circuit at the point at which the signal was given.

Mr. Walker commented -
“The position is complicated and not easy to understand. It is necessary that it should be cleaned up and steps are being taken by the Mines Department to this end.”

When an explosion occurred in a mine it was natural for those men who had not been affected, without waiting for the arrival of the Rescue Brigades to enter the area covered by the explosion with the object of giving aid to any of their comrades who may be alive.

They looked for firedamp and so long as they can keep a light going forward, were unaware of the much greater danger from the carbon monoxide. It was realised that it would be hopeless to try to prevent men acting in this manner but the officials of every mine should have knowledge of this danger and the means by which men unequipped with rescue apparatus can guard against it.

This point was mentioned during the Inquiry and at the close, Mr Walker made some observations upon it which were to the effect that in mines in which an explosion is possible, mice or small birds should be kept in every district for the use of those who attempt rescue operations before the arrival of a Rescue Brigade.

He went on to say -
“The suggestion may seem, no doubt, fantastic, but I know no other means of protecting men in such circumstances. It does not appear efficient, as is now required to keep birds at the surface of every mine for the would be rescuers are themselves already underground and forget or may never have known of the birds kept at the surface. Where birds kept underground their presence would be known and the reason for their presence would become common knowledge.”

The Official Inquiry into the Edge Green Explosion finished with these words -
“In conclusion I desire to record my deep appreciation of the courtesy shown to me by the representative parties to the Inquiry and by all those who attended the Inquiry.
I have the honour to be,
Your Obedient Servant,
HENRY WALKER.”

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