KNOCKSHINNOCH CASTLE
New Cumnock, Ayrshire.
7th September 1950.

The Accident

The accident occurred at about 7.30 p.m. while the afternoon shift was at work on Thursday 7th September 1950 when a large volume of liquid peat or moss suddenly broke into the workings from the surface in the No.5 Heading Section of the Main Coal Seam. The inrush started at the point where the No.5 Heading, which rose at gradient of 1 in 2, had effected a holing at the outcrop of the seam beneath superficial deposits and had made contact with the base of a relatively large natural basin containing glacial material and peat. The liquid matter, rushed down the steep heading and continued to flow for some time and soon filled up a large number of existing and abandoned roadways as well as several working places, until it eventually cut off two means of egress to the surface from the underground workings of the colliery.

There were 135 people underground at the time. Six working near the shaft bottom escaped to the surface by the downcast shaft before it became blocked while 116, with all means of escape cut off, found their way inbye to apart of the mine which was then unaffected by the inrush leaving 13 men who were missing. The 116 men were rescued about two days later and the 13 missing men, all of whom were employed in the No.5 Heading. One was the fireman in charge of the district, one shotfirer and nine coal getters who were employed at the face and three working in other places. There were also two men who were working on the haulage of the district.

The No.5 Heading Section had been developed to exploit the area of Main Coal which lay to the south of the shafts and a pair of headings at 100 feet centres was driven into the coal at a rise in a south easterly direction. These headings were about 18 feet wide and 7 feet high. Connexions were put through between the headings to form stoops about 100 feet square. One of these headings was known as No.5 Heading. It was used as the main haulage and travelling road for the Section and was always kept in advance of it’s companion heading.

A contoured development plan had been sent to the Manager by the Sub-Area Planning Department in April 1950 and this indicated in blue, the extent of the expected progress of the workings until 1st September 1950 and in orange the progress expected from then until the 1st February 1951. It was nothing more that a progress plan based on the already established Stoop and Room system of the working but it did not show that the main development Headings would reach the conjectural position of the Southern Uplands Fault and that at that stage it would have at least 100 feet of cover from the surface. These conjectural plans assumed that the unworked coal ahead rose at a gradient of 1 in 4. After that time, as might have been anticipated in a seam rising towards a major upthrow fault the gradient became steeper and on the 6th July 1950, when the last quarterly survey was made before the inrush, levellings showed that the face of the No.5 Heading was only 196 feet vertically below the surface. By this time it had become obvious to the management that the main headings would not strike the Southern Uplands Fault because of the gradient of the seam, which had been increasing for some time, continued to steepen until it became almost 1 in 2 and that the headings would reach the outcrop of the seam near the surface at a point somewhere south of the shafts. The report commented:-

“this fact does not appear to have been treated by the management as a matter of concern nor as something to which the attention of the planning department should have been drawn.”

For at least a years before the inrush it had been realised by the management that if certain inbye districts of the colliery were to be fully exploited and adequately ventilated, it would be necessary to increase the quantity of the air circulating underground. Eventually, in order to achieve this, it was decided to drive a new dipping drift starting from the surface to meet the underground workings and thus provide an additional airway. This drift was in the course of being driven at the date of the disaster. When this drift was commenced, no one knew that the development headings in the No.5 Heading Section were likely to reach the surface. But as soon as the management realised that the headings, if continued, were bound to reach the surface, the prospect of being able to drive a road in the coal to the surface seemed to have appealed to them. At any rate, during the year the matter was discussed by the undermanager, manager and agent but strangely enough no decision was taken about it. At the inquiry, the undermanager believed that it was the intention to drive No.5 Heading through to the surface to provide a new airway but the manager said that the idea was considered by the agent and rejected. The agent said that the matter was still under consideration a few days before the disaster. The report commented:-

"Altogether, the evidence on this important matter of planning was unsatisfactory,
conflicting and disappointing."

Whatever was said, the No.5 Heading and the companion heading were drive rapidly forward.

Nothing untoward happened until about 10 a.m. on the day shift of Wednesday 30th August when a shot was fired in the breast coal at the face of the No.5 Heading by the fireman, D. Strachan who was one of the victims of the disaster. This shot blew through and exposed what appeared to be a bed of stones, leaving an opening described as two to two and a half feet wide for the full height of the breast coal and four to five feet deep. Water started immediately to run out of this opening but, of the many witnesses that saw none could estimate the flow with any degree of accuracy. It was best described by one of them as the amount that would flow from a two inch pipe.

The water was clear and fresh and had no smell and it was allowed to flow freely down the floor of the heading. The flow of water remained fairly constant until the morning of the accident and did not appear to have caused much alarm to anyone, certainly not any of the officials in the colliery from overmen upwards.

When the holing was effected the place was stopped and no more coal was won from it. The dayshift overman, J.N. Houston, who was on duty in the section at the time, saw the hole about 15 minutes after the shot had been fired. Several other shotholes had been bored in the coal at the face of the heading but none of these had been fired.

Water came from one or more of them but there was disagreement on the number by the witnesses at the inquiry. The manager inspected the place about an hour later and very wisely decided that wooded chocks or pillars should be built to support the roof to supplement the props and bars ordinarily used to support the roof, to make the place more secure. Eight chocks were built in the following week.

Mr. Kennedy the undermanager, visited the face of the heading about noon on the day following the holing but Andrew Houston, the overmen in charge of the back shift did not inspect the face after the shot had blown through. He had been made aware of the position by the day shift overman who informed him that the heading had holed through ‘on the crop’ had been stopped. Mr. J. Bone, the Agent, was also told that the heading had reached the outcrop but he did not visit the place.

On Thursday 31st August, as soon as the No.5 Heading had holed through, the Agent gave instructions for the underground workings to be surveyed and levelled by Mr. Ian Murray, an apprentice surveyor, to determine the exact position of the face of the No.5 Heading and it’s depth below the surface. The survey showed that there was about 38 feet of cover between the roof of the heading and the surface. On the same day a survey was made on the surface by Mr. T.D. Brown, the senior assistant surveyor for the Sanquhar and New Cumnock Colliery Groups. During the course of the survey, a pointed wooden peg, two feet long and two inches square, was knocked into the ground to mark the point immediately above the face of the No.5 Heading. This peg was knocked in by Murray who used a 2-lb. hand hammer and the peg went in more easily than he expected for a peg of it’s size. He was not curious and did not think any more about it but he did notice that the ground underfoot was a ‘wee bit soggy’ Mr. T. Brown, who had walked over the ground while he was taking his measurements described it as ordinary soil. To him it was green pasture with grass on it.

About that time, Mr. Halliday, the manager and Mr. Bone the agent together with Mr. D. Mackinnon, the Sub-Area Planning Engineer, also walked over the ground to see where the No.5 Heading would come out if it were driven right through to the surface.

The report commented:-
“surprising as it might seem, although Mr. Bone and Mr. Mackinnon had previous experience of workings under moss at other collieries, neither of the, noticed the presence of peat or moss or anything unusual in the character of the ground, or even any feature to arouse any suspicion of danger.”

As the development headings had been stopped, the miners who had been working in them had been transferred outbye to new places on the left of the dip side of the No.5 Heading, one place being six and the other seven stoop lengths back from the face of the heading. The other set of miners was put to work in a place going to the right or rise side of the companion heading, six stoop lengths back from the face of the heading. The flow of water through the hole in the No.5 Heading remained fairly constant until the morning of the 7th September, the day of the disaster, when a marked increase in the flow was noticed. It was described as two or three time the flow that had been previously noted.

About 9.30 a.m - the day shift fireman, Thomas McDonald, informed the day shift overman, J.N. Houston about the increase on the flow of water. The overman went to the face of the heading and found that the hole in the coal was a little wider but the stones at the back appeared to be in the same state as when the shot was fired. As the water was finding it’s way into the outbye working places on the dip side of the No.5 Heading the overman gave instructions to one of the oncost men to dig a gutter to confine the water to the heading. The undermanager arrived shortly afterwards but, as he had hurt his knee, he did not go right up to the face but stopped 100 feet short. He discussed the position with the overman but they seemed to have been more concerned as to whether the outbye pumps would be able to deal with the increase of water than with any danger that might lurk there.

3.30 p.m - The increased flow of water carried a lot of loose coal down the heading and an occasional stone or pebble. This caused problems with the conveyor belts with the result that very little actual work was done on that morning. When the overman came to the surface at 3.30 p.m., he informed Mr Kennedy, the undermanager, that the flow of water had not increased since 9.30 a.m. Mr. Bone, The Agent and Mr. Arbuckle, the surveyor were present. He told them that the fireman had reported that two chock pillars had fallen out before the end of the shift. It appeared that the base of the chocks had been levelled on loose dirt and the water had washed this away, loosening the pillars.

On the afternoon shift of the 7th, three sets of miners were sent to work in the places already described, off the No. 5 Heading. The men working in the right hand place were J.D. Houston, T. Houston, and W. McFarlane. In the outbye dip-side place were J. Smith, S. Rowan and W. Lee and in the place a stoop length above were J. Love, J. Murray and J. White.

About 6.30 p.m. the No.5 Heading Section fireman, Daniel Strachan, sent a message saying he wished to see the overman, Andrew Houston. Houston sent word to the fireman to come out and he met him 50 yards inbye from the pit bottom. Strachan said that there had been a big fall at the face of the No.5 Heading and that it extended to a point roughly 300 feet from the return end of the conveyor and that the water had practically stopped running. Houston instructed him to go back and satisfy himself as to the condition of the Section while he went back to have a look at the surface.

Houston went to the surface and found a hole in the ground 25 to 30 feet long and 10 to 15 feet broad and 2 feet deep.

About 6.40 p.m, he telephoned the manager and told him about the fall and the hole on the surface. The manager gave instructions for a fence to be erected round the hole as a right of way existed across the field and as there were not sufficient men at the surface, he told Houston to bring three men out of the pit. The manager had been absent on leave earlier in the day but when he got Houston’s message, he came to the pit to see things for himself.

Houston then went underground to look at the position in the No. 5 Heading. He went along the South Boig Mine and met John Dalziel at his working place at the foot of the Belt Conveyor Heading and at it’s junction with the No.5 Heading he met William Howatt, switch attendant. Houston continued up the No.5 Heading and as he reached a point just inside the return airway he felt a sudden blast of air which came down the heading. He went on inbye and met J. Montgomery, another belt attendant. He spoke to him and almost immediately, J. Haddow, the switch attendant at the tandem belt came outbye. Haddow had seen the framework of the conveyor moving outbye and was making his way out of the pit. At that moment all three heard a ‘terrific roar’ and the trunk belt began to move outbye down the road.

Houston at once took the men with him and turned up the heading on the rise side which lead to the borehole from the surface and from there made his way into the return airway to the top of the Garrowscairn No.3 Dook. From there he went across to the telephone at the end of the West Mine and sent messages to each of the district fireman telling them to withdraw their men immediately. He then went out along the West Mine where he met two men, A. McLatchie and W. Walker running inbye. They had tried to get out but had found the road closed by a mass of sludge. Houston went back to the inbye end of the West Mine where he collected the firemen and their workmen.

It was then established that the following men were missing:-

• Daniel Strachan, fireman in charge of the No.5 Section
• John McLatchie, shotfirer in No.5 Section
• William Howatt, switch attendant
• John Dalziel, loader attendant
• And the nine miners who had been working in the three places off the No.5 Heading.

Meanwhile, a party of men under the leadership of J. Craig, Garrowscairn Section fireman, and S. Capstick, shot firer in the Turf Coal had gone exploring up the return airway down which Houston had recently come. These men had gone to see if it was possible to get out to the surface but had found all roads blocked with sludge.

Fortunately the telephone from the pit bottom to the surface remained in working order and Houston was able to inform the manager of the position. A second exploring party was organized under the leadership of Capstick to go into the No.5 section by way of the return to try to locate the missing men and to see by this time if any road had opened to the surface. This party soon returned without finding any trace of the missing men and confirmed that there was no escape in that direction. This meant that 116 men were imprisoned.

In the meantime, the three workmen who had earlier been directed by Houston to go to the surface, to help with the erection of the fence, had left the pit. They went over to the hole in the field with two surface workers. The party had just started to erect the fence when the ground in the vicinity started to subside rapidly, the ground flowing in from all sides and the hole extended rapidly.

About 7.30 p.m Mr. W.C. Halliday arrived at the colliery . in response to the message from Houston. He went to the surface to see the hole and at once got in touch with the agent. He then returned to the field and the hole was getting bigger. He sent for Cunningham, one of the men who had got out of the pit and asked him if he would go back down the pit and get in touch the overman and tell him that the subsidence in the field was getting bigger. Well knowing the danger, Cunningham at once volunteered.

The Crater Was Getting Bigger

The manger described the crater as water flowing down a sink. He then went to the pit and when he got there received a message from Cunningham at the pit bottom telling him that he had made several attempts and he cold not get up in to the section because the roads were filled with sludge which had driven him back to the pit bottom. The manager instructed him to tell the firemen to withdraw the men from the pit and bring them out. He then went underground himself accompanied by Cunningham. They found the road blocked to the roof with mud near the junction of the North level and the West Mine. They tried to get up the return airway but found it also blocked with mud. Mr. Bone then came down the pit and it was at that time that Andrew Houston telephoned out saying that he had all the workmen with him except for those from No.5 Section.