Manvers Main
Wath-on-Dearne, Yorkshire. 4th March, 1945
The Report of the Causes and circumstances attending the explosion which occurred on the 4th March 1945 at the Manvers Main Colliery, Wath-on-Dearne, South Yorkshire, was conducted by Mr. J.R. Felton, O.B.E., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines and reported to The Right Honourable Emanuel Shinwell, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power on the 20th August 1945.
By arrangement with H.M. Coroner for the City of Sheffield and the Rotherham District of Yorkshire,
Mr. Alan P. Lockwood, M.C. the inquiry was held jointly with the inquest into the deaths of the men at the Town Hall Wath-on-Dearne. Proceedings started on the 23rd May and finished on the 30th May 1945.
The coroner summed up and returned the following verdict of the deaths of the men:-
“In each case I find a verdict of misadventure. The cause of death in the case of Raymond Kelsey was asphyxia due to carbon monoxide poisoning and shock of burns. John Ollett, the same. John Kelsey, the same. Bertram John Conroy, a depressed fracture of the skull. Charles Edward Leeman, shock of burns and multiple crushing, fractures of and injuries to the cranium, thorax and chest. In each case the other findings will be in terms that the deceased died on the 4th March 1945, in the underground workings of the Meltonfield seam of the Manvers Main Collieries, Ltd., at Wath-on Dearne in the West Riding of Yorkshire from the causes already stated and that the deceased was involved in the early hours of the morning in an explosion of gas, firedamp, in the said underground workings. In my opinion the evidence is not sufficient to determine conclusively all the circumstances of the explosion, but points to the following sequence of events:-
a) A cable damaged on a previous shift, such damage exposing the core, followed by an earth leakage and a flash, and the cable being left attached to the switch-box
b) The failure of an automatic switch in the said box to trip out on such earth leakage
c) An emission and accumulation of gas, namely, firedamp, from a cause not ascertained
d) A failure of the ventilation from a cause not ascertained, but possibly due to obstruction by a fall
e) The inadvertent switching on of the power of the cable.”
All interested parties were represented at the inquiry and evidence was heard from twenty two witnesses. There was common agreement on the following points,
1) The explosion was one of firedamp and coal dust played little or no part,
2) It originated in 7’s heading in the vicinity of the Joy Loader and
3) The igniting medium was an electric flash or spark from a short circuit in the trailing cable feeding the Joy loader. Opinions differed as to how the conditions for the explosion occurred.
Professor Statham supported the theory of the manager that there was a fall at the bottom level of the 8th slit before the disaster which interrupted the ventilation and that at the same time, there was an abnormal and local emission of gas. This fall was extensive and it was difficult to see how the men would not try to get out when not occurred. Sir Hartley Shawcross, K.C., who was representing the Company, examined Holmes about the fall and it was possible that the fall had occurred after the explosion. The question of the emission and the accumulation of the gas was looked into and it was said by the management that a short time before the disaster the ventilation was adequate and that no firedamp was detectable on the face in 6’s and 7’s heading but Mr. Houston thought that the emission of gas had persisted for some time. This could be explained by reference to old workings in the Barnsley and Parkgate seam which were 162 and 433 yards below the Meltonfield seam. A plan was produced by Mr. Kimmins which showed that the Barnsley seam had been worked in 1890 and left apillar of solid coal which was again worked in 1932-37. There had been workings in the Parkgate seam in the same area. An opening out had been driven in 1911 and the coal on one side was worked and that on the other side left to for a rib. It was suggested that breaks along this rib would pass through the strata up to the Meltonfield seam. It was agreed that this was possible. Five days after the explosion firedamp was issuing from the two headings into the return. There was evidence of some small breaks in the roof but none in the floor. The inquiry came to the conclusion that it seemed reasonably clear that at some time prior to the explosion there was some additional issue of gas into the headings and it may have come from the seams below.
The ventilation of the headings was examined and the inquiry stated:-
“I desire to urge the importance of managers giving more careful study to the monthly records of air measurements as shown in the air measurements book, with a view to excessive leakages being tracked down and corrective measures being applied to ensure the adequacy of the ventilation at all parts of the workings.”
The source of ignition was thought to have been due to an electrical fault. The inquiry drew attention to the use of auxiliary fans and recommended that:-
“At collieries where auxiliary fans are used the managers should draw up a simple code of rules for the instruction of officials and workmen dealing with these matters, including the periodic measurement of the quantity of air passing in the roadway at which the fan takes it’s supply and the quantity delivered at the safe and the person made responsible for taking and recording such measurements should be properly instructed as to the significance of the readings.”
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