2-Sutton Colliery Disaster

Regulation 12 of the Coal and Other Mines (Support) Regulations, 1956 required that-

“If any a fall of roof or side involving the displacement or breakage of any support had occurred at a place where any person had to work or pass, it shall be the duty of the person for the time being in charge of that part of the mine forthwith to ensure that any roof or side exposed thereby is, if necessary, dressed and is secured by supports and that any such dressing and securing is done before any work of clearing debris is begun, other than such work of clearing debris as is necessary for the setting of supports.”

At about 11 a.m., the Anderton shearer loader arrived back at the stable to the left of the loader gate, having completed it’s second cut. P. Smith and D. Reeves, loader gate stable hole men, were instructed by Mr. Bacon, acting as undermanger, to clean up on the face side of the face conveyor engine to enable it to be advanced 20 inches. They were doing this when a stone, about 3 feet by 3 feet by 18 inches fell from a height of 10 to 20 feet from the cavity above the arches and struck the conveyor motor. Immediately there was flash and a bang and they were thrown forward onto the floor. a ball of flame, which appeared to be red and blue in colour, passed over them and they felt the heat. There was also thick dust and smoke.

The flame travelled at least the greater part of the loader gate to it’s junction with the 30’s loader gate. It also travelled most of the length of the face. Evidence of the flame passing along the face was given by J., Hill, return gate ripper. He said that at about 11.30 a.m. he and J. Flay were instructed by S. Derbyshire, shotfirer, to go 30 or 40 yards up the face to act as sentries while he fired two ripping shots in the return gate. Both shots were fired. Hill said he was in a kneeling position facing the loader gate. A few minutes after the second shot was fired, he felt a gust of hot dust-laden air and saw flame coming from the loader gate. This turned him completely round until he was facing the return gate. His left arm and neck were scorched. He had the impression that the flame travelled along the coal face to the left hand end and returned along the waste side edge.

The men on the face made their way out, together with the men in the return gate, by groping their way in the dust to 306 right side gate, through the door and sheet on this gate, to 28’s loader gate. There was evidence that these men found difficulty in opening the door on 30’s right gate and found it could only be partly opened. The men employed in the loader gate made their way outbye groping along the 28’s gate conveyor to 30’s loader gate where the air was cleaner.

First aid was rendered to the inured men with what material was available. Eight of them were carried out on stretchers and the remainder either ran or were assisted out by colleagues. Some were naked to the waist. All 25 men received burns of varying degrees. Two were allowed to go home after treatment and 23 were admitted to Mansfield General Hospital. Most of the men had arrived at the Medical Centre about 12.25 p.m. The National Coal Board’s Area Medical Officer, Dr. Fernandez arrived at the colliery at 12.25 p.m. and found 15 men awaiting attention. Dr. Round, the Assistant Medical Officer arrived at 12.30 p.m. The first ambulance arrived at 12.50 and was quickly followed by others. The injured men were taken to hospital where a team of surgeons we ready to give attention. All the victims suffered multiple burns.

Those who died from their injuries-

W. Savage aged 29 years. Coal getter,
J.W. Betts aged 55 years. Ripper,
J. Lemm aged 35 years. Shearer assistant,
L. Reeves aged 45 years. Coal getter
J. Godber aged 16 years. Supplies hand.

Those seriously injured-

G. Atterby aged 28 years. Faceworker,
S. Brewer aged 46 years. Shearer driver,
F. Bradley aged 32 years. Faceworker,
W. Bacon aged 37 years. Acting undermanager,
F. Clayton aged 33 years. Faceworker,
G.I. Deakin aged 16 years. Supplies hand,
W. Fudge aged 23 years. Faceworker,
C. Fudge aged 29 years. Faceworker,
J.W. Kirk aged 52 years. Deputy,
T. Lindley aged 30 years. Faceworker,
W. Middleton aged 33 years. Shearer assistant,
W. Riley aged 45 years. Faceworker,
H. Sage aged 17 years. Belt driver,
S. Wilson aged 32 years. Faceworker
S. Ward aged 39 years. Faceworker.

A call was made to the Mansfield Rescue Station and they called the Chesterfield station for assistance. The Mansfield men descended the pit by noon and the Chesterfield team was at the colliery by 12.12 p.m. A fresh air base was established at the junction of 30’s loader and 28’s loader gates at 12.55 p.m. The teams were informed that all the men had been accounted for but two ponies had been left 200 yards along 30’s loader gate. They were brought out by the rescue team at 1.26 p.m. The rescue team explored 28’s loader gate and face and returned to the base at 2.30 p.m. They reported 3.5 per cent firedamp at 28’s return gate ripping and 2.5 per cent in 28’s return gate. The smouldering clothes and conveyor belting was suppressed with extinguishers. Mr. Firth, the Group Manager, arrived at the fresh air base at 2.40 p.m. and he instructed the rescue team to examine 28’s and 30’s faces and come out by 30’s return gate to the fresh air base. They reported the whole of the district clear and the canary which they carried was not affected.

The report of the causes of and the circumstances attending the explosion which occurred at the Sutton Colliery, Nottinghamshire on 21st. February 1957, was conducted by A. Winstanley, C.B.E. D.Sc. H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines, and reported to The Right Honourable Lord Mills, K.B.E., Minister of Power on 11th. November 1957.

The inquest was delayed so that the injured men could recover to give evidence. At Mansfield on 7th October 1957, Mr. Winstanley attended the inquest before H.M. Coroner and a jury. On open verdict was returned on the dead. The inquiry examined the circumstances of the roof falls and said that steps should have been taken to control the movement of the strata and support the roof and sides where necessary for keeping the workplace secure and was required by the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954. With regard to e ventilation, it was found that there were difficulties with the new Davidson diesel driven fan and it was not possible to start the fan until after the explosion. There had been difficulty in getting anerometer readings and there were many places that restricted the air flow. Little regard was taken to these restrictions and along with leakage it was agreed that the ventilation was insufficient to prevent firedamp accumulating.

There was no reference to firedamp having been detected in the statutory reports. T. Buckley, the day shift overman made test in the loader gate on the 20th. February but he made no tests in the cavity because Mr. Bacon, undermanger, and Mr. Kirk, deputy were in the district and he wanted to get away to 30’s district. The afternoon shift overman, W. Warren, said he tested for gas on the 20th February in the cavity in the roof. He found no gas and a ripper, W. Adams confirmed this. J, Aldred, the night shift overman also tested for gas in the cavity. He found no gas and two rippers H. Camm and H. Coleman saw him make the test. A. Walker the night shift overman had spent most of the time on the shift before the explosion, supervising the work in the loader gate. He saw a shot fired and tested for gas in the cavity along with N. Cox, the night shift deputy and no firedamp was found. S. Derbyshire, shotfirer, fired shots in the coal at the loader gate stable hole at about 6 a.m. on 21st. February. He did not teat in the cavity as he considered it too high and dangerous as small pieces of dirt were falling from the sides. There was no doubt that the cavity contained firedamp before the explosion and the overflow may have flowed off as a thin layer near the roof. It was also found that the management failed to have air samples and measurements taken as required by the Coal and Other Mines (Ventilation) Regulations, 1956 and the ventilation along the 28’s intake loader gate failed to dilute and render harmless the inflammable gas which eventually filled the cavity.

Contraband was not found in the district and smoking or naked lights could be ruled out as a source of ignition. All the lamps from the district were examined and found to be in good order. It was undoubtedly the electrical flash that was the source of ignition. The terminal box was smashed and forced into contact with another part of the earthed casing causing the flash and the resulting explosion.

The Inspector recommended that“

Falls of ground which result in large cavities such as occurred in this case can and should be prevented by well known methods of strata control and support. Small falls of ground shown the need for more intensive support which is usually necessary also to prevent the falls from spreading. The top and sides of the activities left by such falls should be supported and packed and until this has been completed they should be ventilated to prevent accumulations of firedamp.
Any large cavities in the roof should never be concealed by supports and cover boards, which act as an umbrella and are unable to prevent danger from further falls and from accumulations of firedamp.
A minimum of 20 feet of packing should be stipulated between a road used for ventilation of transport and any waste exceeding 100 feet in width.
Electrical apparatus and cables should be effectively protected against
Damage such as might cause incendive open sparking, or, where this is impracticable, the electrical apparatus or cables should be moved to a safe place. The possibility of elimination indecendive sparking, by reducing the time of acting of automatic devices for cutting off electricity in the event of excessive earth leakage or short circuit, should be investigated.
Section 55 (1) (a) of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1956, requires the manager of every mine to take such steps as are necessary for the securing that there is constantly produced in all parts of the mine below ground ventilation adequate for the purpose-
Diluting gases that are inflammable or noxious so as to render them harmless and removing them.
In this connection ventilation standards on the planes suggested in National Coal Board Bulletin No. 55/153 entitled "Planning the Ventilation of new and reorganised Collieries" should be applied to all mines and efforts should be made without delay to bring these below the standards at least up to the minimum suggested.
Where two intake roads are provided to any coal face without a return airway between them, they should not be more than 30 yards apart to avoid unreliable ventilation of that part of the face between them.” After the disaster it was decided by H,M, Inspectors and the National Coal Board officials that the cavities should be drained of firedamp by means of pipe columns and if necessary the use of a venturi ejectors. Further work in the panel was stopped until it was sure that there was no residual burning in the area and the work on the cavities was completed b the 7th. March 1957 when an inspection was carried out and work resumed.