Auchengeigh
- The Disaster, Continued -

Earlier, as the in-going train was nearing the inbye terminus, Campbell had received Boyd’s message about not letting the men down the haulage. He thought the message meant that his authorised guard and any men who remained on the bogies were to be withdrawn. He was not unduly worried at this time and when he received the first signal to bring the bogies outbye, he assumed that only the guard was on board but the signal to start and stop lead him to believe that there was something wrong. The train was about half way out when the haze in the engine house turned to thick black smoke and he could not see the train position indicator. Conditions became worse and Campbell could stay no longer and was faced with the difficult decision of whether or not to stop the train. He did no know how many men were on the train and it passed his mind to leave the engine house without stopping the train which would have continued to the outbye engine house and cut out automatically. He was slowing down the engine when he heard a voice and he decided to stop the bogie for fear of running down any men who were trying to escape on foot. He brought the train to rest 100 yards from the terminus. By this time, about 7.15 a.m. Campbell was almost overcome but was able to make his way out through the separation doors near the Main Coal haulage engine to the intake air and from there he later rode in the downcast shaft to the surface.

A number of men were waiting near the outbye terminus for a third train to take them inbye when the haze thickened to smoke. They went into the fresh air which was leaking through the separation doors in a connection a short distance outbye but while they were waiting they heard something moving. Some of them went back into the smoke and found Green groping around in zero visibility. They took him to the upcast shaft bottom.
G. Brown, the onsetter at the bottom of the upcast shaft, was also overcome and was rescued and taken into the air intake and then up the downcast shaft. Tribute was paid to the parties who rescued these two men at the inquiry.
After the discovery of the belt blaze, Dickson stopped the motor and hurried to the No.5 haulage house, about 50 yards away and picked up a fire extinguisher. He returned to the fire but found that it would not work. He instructed A. Cunningham, a deputy, and others who had followed him to the fan, to try to smother the fire with sand and stone dust while he went to the phone. He contacted the surface from the No.6 Bench, about 100 yards from the fan and asked for extinguishers to be sent down. He also told the surface that the fan was not working. He collected another extinguisher from the No.6 transformer house but this also would not work. He did not look for any more but went to the phone at the No.6 Bench and called for extinguishers and hoses.

He had to wait a moment or two before the pumpman on the switch board at the bottom of the shaft connected his call to the surface.

Dickson then went to the No.5 Bench to prepare the hydrants for the hoses but found that they had been blanked off. There was a hydrant 300 yards away in the No.6 roadway but he thought this was too far away and decided to take the hydrant and fix it to the water range at the No.5 Bench. He was assisted in this task and the hydrant was ready when the hoses arrived some time later. At about 7.15 a.m., he contacted the surface and spoke to D. Gray, a general duties man, in the lamproom, and asked for the Rescue Brigades to be summoned. Up to this time, Dickson had seen only the inside of the fan house.

After the train had left, two deputies, M. Lynch and J. Roe, had walked down the return airway, through Johnstone’s Crosscut and had arrived at the fan shortly after Dickson. They had seen the fan casing and the oil burning at 7.05 a.m. Roe helped Lynch to put stone dust on the fire for a short time and then went through the three bypass doors. Lynch, who had local fire service experience, tested the extinguishers that had failed when Dickson tried to use them and found them unworkable. He followed Roe through the doors and both men saw flames coming from the fan outlet and striking the roof on the right hand side of the road between the fan and the safety fence. F. McDonald, a brusher, said that at 7.15 a.m. the belt had been reduced to ashes, the fan casing was alight and when he went through the doors shortly afterwards, he saw fire in the roof outbye of the fan.

Boyd reached the fan shortly before 7.30 a.m. when the fire in the fan was still burning but when he went through the doors, he saw only smouldering in the roadway between the fan and the safety fence although the return airway was on fire outbye of the by-pass junction. When Pettigrew went through the three doors a few minutes later, he found a fire and a fall of roof at the junction.

There was some uncertainty as to the time when the hoses were taken down the pit but it was about 8 a.m. or a few minutes after. The equipment reached the scene of the fire between 8.20 and 8. 30 a.m. and it was quickly out into service by men under the supervision of Pettigrew. At first only one hose was used but later equipment was brought down by the Rescue Brigade and two more were brought into use. Fire fighting continued throughout the day and for some time they were able to control the fire but after a time they were hampered by falls of roof which occurred as the wooden lagging above the girders was burnt away.

It was much later in the morning that Pettigrew learned of the men trapped in the return airway and he instructed R. Harvey, the safety officer, to carry out a check of all men in the pit. This was done and Harvey went to the surface where a similar check was made by the manager at about 8 a.m. As a result of these checks it was found that forty seven men were missing.

At the surface, soon after Pettigrew and McKinnon went down the pit, Kirkpatrick, the pump maintenance man, who had learned of the fire from Thornton, the electrician at the bottom of the pit, reached the surface with J. White, a roadman, and began to assemble hoses and extinguishers. The manager prepared to go down the pit but he had not at this time, anticipated that lives were in danger. On his way to the lamproom at about 7.20 a.m. he saw Green being brought out of the pit unconscious and recognised that something was very seriously wrong underground. He realised that it was unsafe to use the upcast shaft and immediately gave instructions for winding in the shaft to stop. He told White to tell the engineman of the downcast shaft that the needles were to be lifted at once and then to go down the pit himself and see that the lifting operation was properly carried out and the job done quickly.

The fire fighting equipment collected by Kirkpatrick and White was waiting to go down the shaft when the needles were lifted. The banksman, T. Montgomery, said White descended at 7.35 a.m. and the needles were lifted and the rope lengths adjusted by a drum clutch to allow winding down to the pit bottom. The manager telephoned C.M. Inglis the Group Manager before contacting the Rescue Brigade and the Area General Manager and B. Spencer, H.M. Senior District Inspector of Mines and Quarries and L. Cheesborough, H.M. District Inspector were informed and quickly arrived at the colliery.

The call was received at the Coatbridge Rescue Station at 7.40 a.m. and the first team left at 7.45.a.m. and arrived at the colliery seven and a half miles away at 8.a.m.
The second team followed ten minutes behind. After a briefing by the manager, the first team of five men descended at 8.08 a.m. and immediately set up a fresh air base on the intake side of the pair of separation doors nearest the man-riding haulage, wearing self-contained breathing apparatus they made a preliminary inspection and reported that the atmosphere was very bad, they had been unable to see anything but had stumbled on a body. The team returned and recovered the body. Artificial Resuscitation was given for about half an hour but without success.

In the meantime the second team went into the return airway and remained for fifteen minutes reporting that conditions were no better and they came out with some of the team distressed by heat. The atmosphere was full of carbon monoxide which after tests, was determined at 0.4 per cent which would cause death in a minute or two.

From 9.30 a.m. onwards the rescue teams made regular examinations along the return airway near the shaft and took air samples. The Superintendent looked into the return airway and decided that conditions were so bad that it was not a justified risk of life to send men in. All hope was lost for the men trapped in the airway. Signal bells were heard about 4.30 p.m. but it was discovered that the signal had been caused by a fall of roof.
The operations went on and it was realised that the fire was not being brought under control and there were indications that methane was building up in the mine and R.J. Evans, H.M. District Inspector advised that all men should be withdrawn. This was done with the agreement of all parties. Hoses that had been laid in the downcast pit bottom were brought into use to start flooding the valleys in the intake and return airways near Johnstone’s Crosscut and to seal off the fire.

Top

Charles Sharkey
Rescue Brigadesman