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Ventilation and Measurements of Air Current
The Coal Mines Act 1911 and attending regulations require the measurement each month, of the quantity of air in the main ventilation current to each seam, in every split in the current, where an intake road into a district forked off from the main intake road and at a point 100 yards back from the first working place at the face.
These measurements were required to be recorded in a book maintained in the mine for that purpose.
These sensible requirements were designed to ensure that adequate ventilation was provided throughout the workings and that it was duly recorded. The last measurements, prior to the explosion, of the air in various parts of the mine were recorded in December 20 th 1917 .
But, at the inquiry, it was established that the management contrived sections 24 (1) and 29 (2) of the Act. The manager’s explanation was, that these measurements were made by Jones; an overman, who was one of the victims of the explosion and were entered in his notebook, but not in the prescribed book.
As the notebook had not been recovered, the manager was unable to state the volume of air, which travelled the faces of the various districts and whether or not there was any undue leakage between the entrance to the ventilating districts and faces.
A further breach of section 62 (3) was recorded, by the failure to remove, as far as practicable, coal dust from the floor, roof and sides.
Mr. J.B. Atkinson, for 40 years H.M.I. of Mines, now consulting mining engineer representing the Miners Federation of Great Britain, stated at the inquiry:
“The roads traversed by the explosion contained an excess of coal dust”. And it was his opinion that, “this was the propagating agent”. Mr. Atkinson alleged that the Home Office had not taken proper measures to obviate the dangers arising from coal dust. He thought that they had been lacking in not drawing up proper regulations, and he also complained of their interference with Inspector’s reports. He resigned because of this.
There was further evidence when Mr. Cave of the North Staffs Miners Federation, called two witnesses. The first, Mr. George Harrison, of High St. Halmerend said he worked on the main level of the Bullhurst district for some weeks before the explosion, and these districts were very dusty. Formally, a man named Mainwaring was employed to clear up the dust, but he had left two or three months before, and, due to the men trampling though the dust, he said: “We could hardly see one an other when we were going out”. The second witness, Sam Bate, of high St. Halmerend, stated: “The main north level was six inches thick with dust. At weekends, lads cleared some of the dust away”.
Detailed plans, prepared with extraordinary care, showing the conditions in the pit after the explosion were put in and explained by Mr. Sethna, the colliery surveyor.
In addition a pit prop, thickly covered on one side by coked coal dust was produced. Mr. Biddington, the workman’s representative from Talke, said, the specimen prop was a fair sample from the bulk.
Having considered the dust aspect, let us look at the gas aspect, as these combined, only need a source of ignition to cause an explosion and both of the previous explosions, 1898 and 1915, were attributed to gob fires.
Gas and Shot Firing
In the working of the Banbury, Seven feet and Bullhurst seams, firedamp was given off freely. The manager, realising this, instructed his officials to withdraw the men when 2% or more gas was found in the working place and that a report was to be entered in the book kept for that purpose.
A breach of the 1911 Act section 14 (3) was recorded at the inquiry. A fireman had been assigned a district of such a size, that he was prevented from carrying out in a thorough manner all his statutory duties. H. Downing, in evidence stated that, when the manager assigned the district to him, he objected to taking it, on the grounds that it was too large. Then a shot-firerer was appointed to assist him in making the statutory inspections.
Evidence was given that shortly after midnight on January 11th the colliers in Ratcliffe’s place had come out owing to the presence of gas and sent for Rowley, who was described as assistant fireman and shotlighter. Rowley examined the place and found 1.5% of gas. He told the men to go back, but made no report because he considered that one was not required unless an official had withdrawn the workmen. After the inquiry it was recommended that a report be made if a workman had withdrawn himself.
In the Banbury seam, the fireman fired shots, as well as the shot firer, and, from the shot-firing book, there was evidence that those fired by the fireman, amounted at times to 40 per shift. The fireman, after being pressed by the Inspector, admitted more than two hours of the shift were taken up with the firing of shots. He estimated that each shot took him 3 minutes. But in cross-examination, he admitted it would take nearly 10 minutes. The practice followed in the Banbury seam was illegal.
All inspections in a fireman’s district, under sections 64-65 of the Act, must be made by the fireman in charge of that district, and if the fireman is allowed to fire any shots, the district assigned to him must be of such a size that shot firing does not interfere with his statutory duties. (Section 14)
Gas Explosion Coal Dust
As was mentioned earlier, the Minnie pit was a gassy pit, and Joe Johnson said, on the night before the explosion, he was working at the top of No4 district and during the night there was about 1.5% of gas in the place, which increased when tops came down in the adjacent Carter’s place.
Men working in Cartlidge’s place and Radcliffe’s, both at the top of No. 4 district, spoke of the presence of gas there on the night before the explosion.
Mr. Granville Pool, H.M.I. of Mines, was of the opinion that the point of origin of the explosion was in the gob at the top of No. 4 district, and the cause of ignition possibly, a damaged safety lamp, but more probably sparking from the Bulldog stone. As propagation or spread of explosion was concerned, he thought the first ignition was of gas and that this developed into a coal dust explosion, pure and simple.
Mr. Frank Lingard, who had worked as a miner in the Minnie pit for 26 years, describing the sparks he had seen in the mine, when Bulldog stone was breaking and falling from the roof, states:
“As near as I can tell you, it was like a tram going along, strikes one of the cups, it is like that only a longer streak, like an electric flash”.
Here were all the ingredients of a disastrous explosion of gas, a source of ignition, and coal dust.
Any Lessons to be Learned?
Were there any lessons to be learned? Well, the Coal Mines Act 1911 was the culmination of years of work by the Royal Commisson of 1906, and embodied the knowledge and experience, often bitter, of the miners, the mines Inspectorate and owners, over many years. It was a serious attempt to get standards for safety and conditions in an industry with a long history of danger, sudden death and disaster. Consequently, the provisions of the Act were quite positive in their protection of the workers from these inherent dangers.
But, they recognised also that these aims would not be achieved on a voluntary basis. For this reason the Act spelt out the penalties attending failure to comply with its many requirements.
Unfortunately these penalties were not a very effective deterrent. For an example let’s look at the Senghenydd Pit Disaster in Glamorgan, when on the 14 October 1913 no less than 439 lives were lost in a violent explosion. The coal dust had not been dealt with properly, a matter on about which the Chief Inspector of Mines took a most serious view at the inquiry, and on behalf of the Home Office, the Inspector prosecuted the owners and manager for breaches of the Coal Mines Act. On the coal dust charges, the manager was fined £5 or 14 days in goal. Altogether there were convictions on five charges, and the total fines were £24. The local newspaper headed its report, “Miners lives at One and a Penny Farthing each, ”(Five and a Half Pence)
It was obvious that the penalties inflicted for breaches of mining law, bore no relation to the gravity of the offences committed, nor were they on such a scale as to be an effective deterrent. How many more lives were lost under similar circumstances?
155 at the Minnie pit can be taken as one example.
Of all the stories told about the Minnie pit, before and at the time of the explosion, few can be so well authenticated and so sadly prophetic as told by Mr. Fred Burgess of Bignal End, when he was 90 years of age. He said he had ignored his father’s pleas to continue working with him; otherwise he would almost certainly have been a teenage fatality in the explosion.
At the age of 13 he started at Jammage pit on the screens, where he sorted the stone from the coal. Then at 16 he joined his father at the Minnie, loading for him in the Bullhurst seam. He tells of the numerous times that he and the men with whom he made his way to their place of work, someone would remark, “our clogs will be battering against the roof one of these days”, as they approached the Bullhurst.
So extensive was the accumulation of gas that their lamps, when raised to little more than shoulder height, would all but, be extinguished. Such was their concern that Burgess, Dick Pool, Arthur Roades and Arthur Morgan, made up their minds to give two weeks notice of their intention to leave employment at the Minnie. They worked their notice, which ended exactly one week before the explosion. Burgesses father was killed.
Another quirk of fate relates to Harry Lee. He started work at the Minnie on his 14th birthday, his two elder brothers, Josiah, age 16 and Eli, age 17, already worked there, but he was saved from certain death. After working with Josiah, he changed places with Eli, Harry going to the Rearers. On the day of the explosion, Harry managed to get out, but Josiah and Eli were in the Seven Feet seam and both were killed.
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