Edge Green
Ashton-in-Makerfield, Lancashire. 12th November, 1932

The second explosion in Mr. Coatesworth’s opinion was caused by something left burning by the first but he was not prepared to say definitely where that burning was. He thought that it was at the fall at the top of the No.8 brow but it might have been elsewhere. The suggestion that the damaged safety lamp had been the cause of the explosion was dismissed by Mr. Coatesworth. Mr. L.T. McBride, Senior Inspector of Mines, agreed with this opinion.

There was now only the one other cause, namely electricity, which was in use in the No.5 Brow district at the time of the explosion for the purpose of giving signals. The evidence was quite clear that Harold Hesketh, the driver of the haulage engine working the haulage along No.12 Level received a signal from the gangrider who was in the shunt on that level between No.7 an 8 Brow "to stretch up" and within a short interval, Hesketh gave the interval as 13 seconds and then as 18 seconds, he heard a report like a shot which came out of the No.12 Level and was followed by dust also out of that level. There was no doubt that an electric spark made when that signal was given, ignited firedamp which had collected in the shunt on No.12 Level. Mr Charlton thought that firedamp would accumulate in a caunch or ripping and even if a strong current of air is passing beneath and would remain there.

During the Inquiry, suspicions became fastened on the brickwork wall with a door in to which had been erected in No.12 Level in an endeavour to prevent air leaking fro the intake outbye long this level. There were no less than ten brattice sheets across No.12 Level in addition to the brock wall which had had a door in to it, but in which the door had been replaced by a brattice sheet because the movement of the hauling engine kept the door open.

The manager, who said that he knew the district better than the fireman, described the condition of the brattice sheets and of the brick was in the No.12 Level and said that the brattices were good, fairly heavy, and three or four layers thick. They were swung from the roof bar and fastened to the roof bar and swung down and fastened at their sides as well. In regard to the brick wall, he said it went up to the roof and it had a door frame, about four feet by four feet from which the door was taken away and replaced by a brattice sheet.

Mr. Latham described the brattice sheets to be good but there was still a leakage of air along the No.12 Level but that leakage was very small. Some air leaked air trough three brattice sheets between Nos.9 and 8 Brows and turned down No.8 Brow that some went on through the sheet over the door frame in the brick wall and the brattice sheet between Nos.8 and 7 brows and turned down No.7 brow. The remainder of the leakage went on and through the two brattice sheets between Nos.7 and 6 Brows and turned down No.6 Brow. Keeping these conditions in view and remembering that the seam dipped one in five and a half to the goaf, there had been no difficulty whatever with firedamp until the goaf was formed. The air had to travel a long way and therefore the air current sluggish. Was it natural that firedamp would creep along the roof from the goaf up into the No.12 Level in spite of the ‘very small’ leakage of air along that level of which Mr. Latham gave evidence? The answer could only be ‘Yes’.

Such behaviour of firedamp is within the knowledge of mining men with experience of the working of inclined seams. What Manager who had tried to course the air down an inclined face had not experienced the great difficulty of preventing the firedamp given off that face from accumulating at the top end?

Two questions remained to be answered, namely:-
1) Why did not the firemen discover firedamp in No 12 level? and
2) At what height from the ground was the signalling push in the shunt in that level? The two firemen, Marsh and Storer and the gangrider Albert Woodcock on No.12 Level were recalled to give evidence on the last day of the Inquiry. Storer was called first and he was asked to describe exactly the route followed when making an inspection of the No5 brow district. This he did. He was asked to show exactly where on that route he made the theses for gas and this he did. Marsh was also called and he was asked to do the same having given his replies it is clear from the replies of the firemen that neither of them made any teats for firedamp on the no 12 level. According to the evidence given by Mr. Latham he did not expect the firemen to take any test on No 12 level except at the far end.

It maybe said that the drawers and the others working at the No.12 Level would have smelled firedamp if it had accumulated there. The reply to this is that on the Sunday following the explosion, there were places in the No.5 Brow were there was so much firedamp that safety lamps had, if they were to be kept alight, to be kept close to the floor and yet that firedamp even to those on the look out for it was not smelled. There certainly was a smell at the bottom of the No.7 Brow on that day but even to sense that smell, it was necessary to be within a very small radius of a certain spot.

The effect of the presence and movement of the drawers and of tubs passing to and fro along the No.12 Level would be to mix the firedamp and air between the brattice sheet. Albert Woodcock followed the fireman Marsh in the witness box on the last day of the inquiry and on being asked to indicate in what position his had would be when he was pressing the push in the shunt on the No.12 Level he raised his hand to a point slightly above his head. He was five foot eleven inches tall.

Coupling with these facts the evidence by the electricians during the inquiry in reference to the constantly recurring occasions on which covers of such pushes had to be replaced or repaired, the apparently casual manner in which, and the frequent intervals at which, the underground electrician made inspection of the signalling apparatus. The evidence given by Mr. Cowan in regard to the numerous bare places evidently made for the purpose of bringing the conductors together for the purpose of giving signals and the fact that on that day of the explosion I myself saw an uncovered electric bell-push on No.5 Brow near by Hesketh’s hauling engine I have no hesitation in reporting that the first explosion caused by the ignition of firedamp which had accumulated in No.12 Level and the cause of the ignition was the open sparking signal given by Hesketh to ‘Stretch up’.

It may well be asked if the explosion has occurred as I have said why did one not occur before? At the foot of the No.9 Brow there was marked a break in the roof. That break was along the low side of and touching the pillar of coal and ran along by that side of that pillar towards No.8 brow.

On the last day of the inquiry, a witness, Francis Smith, of whose important evidence would not have been presented but for the fact the Mr. Latham, when giving his evidence, said that he had not been given certain information by Smith. Smith said that when he was working at the bottom of the No.9 Brow about 9 o’clock on the night of Friday 11th November, that is some five hours previous to the explosion, the waste below the No.9 Brow was weighting but there was no beak in the roof. The break was there after the explosion and if firedamp came off at that break, as no doubt it did, it would rest on the sluggish current of air, keep to the high side of the place which was the side at which it was emerging at the break pass along No.8 Brow up that brow to No.12 Level and accumulate in the space provided between the roof and the level of the lintel of the door frame in the brick wall. This course of events may have been the answer to the question but it has also to be remembered that Captain Platt in his evidence in reference to his experiments with the electric bells said that he did not get an ignition of firedamp every time he made and broke the external circuit.

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