Prior To The Explosion

The deputy on the fore shift made his own pre-shift inspection before passing his men inbye the meeting station, which he could carry out in half an hour, but those for the other two shifts were made by the deputy of the previous shift. The deputy of the third shift, the one prior to the explosion, made his second and last inspection between 9 and 10 p.m. before his shift finished at 11.10 p.m. The various canvas sheets and brattices were then in position and the ventilation was taking its proper course.

During his shift he made frequent tests for gas at the goaf edges and in the working places but found none. Both the lift in the No.8 Left and the 'jenkin' (bord lift) in No 8 Right had been cut during the latter part of the shift but in neither face had the band been cleaned of the coal drilled. The arcwall coal-cutter had been brought back to the outbye side of the No.8 Right turn, one Joy loader was back from the face of the No.5 Skirting. Both shuttle cars were back at the charging station ready for the batteries to be charged.

The deputy of the third shift met his successor, the deceased deputy, N. Holmes at the surface at 12 midnight and informed him of the position in the 69A District. Holmes went underground at 12.22 a.m. with his shift and probably started his inspection about 12.45 a.m. The last few pages of the Deputies report book, which were blown out from the meeting station, were found torn and illegible and showed signs of burning. There was no legible entry for the last per-shift inspection by deputy Holmes but his inspection of the previous day, the
5th June, was timed to commence at 12.45 a.m. and was completed by 1.30 a.m.

The amount of work done by the new shift certainly pointed to one of two things. First that Holmes completed his pre-shift inspection well before 1.30 a.m. or that he admitted his men piece-meal prior to a full inspection being completed. There was visual evidence in the form of chalked initials and date to indicate that he had inspected all the working places. According to, the haulage engineman, two shuttle car loads of stone and coal had been discharged to the conveyor belt, one loaded by 1.25 a.m. and it could be assumed these loads came from the No.8 Right face which was found cleaned ready for drilling and charging shot holes. A third shuttle car load was being obtained in No.8 Left face at the time of the explosion. This meant that the Joy loader had first been taken into the No.8 Right face and then to the No.8 Left face and that both the shuttlecars had been moved from the charging stations to these places. No loading had been done with the other Joy loader in the No.6 Skirting but the coal cutting machine had been moved during this shift from outbye of the No.8 Right turn to the junction of the No.6 Bord with No.6 Right Cross-cut. The moving of the machinery would entail passing through the canvas sheets and may have cause an undetected interruption in the ventilation.

The explosion occurred at 1.50 a.m. on Friday 6th July 1951 during the second hour of the first shift while the full complement of 13 men were at work. All the nine men on the working face were killed. Seven of them died in the explosion and two died later from their injuries but four others who were outbye at the time escaped without injury. None of the 348 persons at work in other parts of the mine including 39 in the other South Busty workings were affected.

The alarm was raised by the engineman, who was on the landing at the tub loading point when he felt a sudden rush of air outbye followed by a thick cloud of dust. He telephoned the shaft bottom and the shift overman, who was in the adjourning district at the time. On reaching the district, he went inbye after testing the ventilation. He found the conveyor belt dislodged and lying across Norman Holmes, the deputy and near him was William George Hicks, the shuttlecar driver. Both men were alive but badly injured and he arranged to get them to the surface.

Shortly before 3 a.m. the first rescue team arrived on the scene and explored most of the district before turning back in the return airway owing to thick smoke and fumes. About this time, the undermanager, discovered that the two doors leading to the main return airway for the South Side had been blown open by the blast. This was completely short circuiting the air in the district but the doors were not damaged and they were quickly restored. The rescue teams replaced the canvas sheets inbye which had been destroyed by the explosion and by 3.30 a.m. the ventilation began to take it's normal course. All the bodies were out of the mine by 6.30 a.m. and it was possible by 7 a.m. to explore the whole district without breathing apparatus.

At the face of the No.8 Left, the body of Thomas Box, the operator was found lying alongside his Joy loader and Ronald Foster, the driver was in a sitting position facing outbye in the driving seat of the shuttle car. Richard Parker, shotfirer and Albert Patterson, driller, were found on the No.4 Main Bord between Nos. 7 and 8 Right Cross-cuts. James Walker and Allan Hunter, cuttermen were found at their arcwall machine at the junction of the return airway with No.6 Right Cross-cut. Robert Tait, the other Joy loader operator was found on
the main bord between Nos. 5 and 6 Right Cross-cuts.

The explosion district was examined within five hours of the disaster by representatives of the National Coal Board, the workmen and the Mines Inspectorate and they reported on the state of the area, the course and travel of the explosion and the source of the firedamp.

The inquest into the deaths of the seven men killed in the explosion was held at the Miner's Welfare Hall, Hetton-le-Hole before, the Coroner for the Easington Ward County Durham on the 5th and 6th December 1951. He recorded the following verdict:-
"These men died as a result of an explosion caused by some fault in the electrical equipment of the Joy loader."
The jury added the following rider:-
"The lack of supervision with regard to maintenance and repair of these machines was most alarming and should be immediately rectified."

At a second inquest on the two men who died later was held on the 11th February 1952 by the Coroner for Sunderland and a verdict of Accidental death' was recorded with the following rider:-
"The jury considered there had been some negligence in the maintenance of a pit machine and also lack of care in steps taken to discover the presence of gas."

The inquiry into the disaster was held by R. Yates, C.B.E., D.S.O, M.C., H.M. Deputy Chief Inspector of Mines and presented to the Minister of Fuel and Power, the Right Honourable Geoffrey Lloyd, M.P. in
April 1952 and the causes of the disaster were examined:-

No contraband was found in the workings or in the clothing of any of the victims and smoking in the mine was ruled out as a source of ignition.

No shots had been fired during the shift but shotholes in the No.8 Right were being charged at the time of the explosion.

All the lamps in the district that were recovered were examined at the Mines Research establishment and passed as safe with the exception of two electric cap lamps. These had damage which was caused before the explosion and it was possible that they could have ignited firedamp in this state but the inquiry dismissed this as being very unlikely.

There was no indication of any frictional heating of any kind.

All the fixed electrical equipment was found to be in flameproof condition.

Of the portable apparatus, the only ones that were in use at the time was the Joy loader and the shuttle car at the face of the No.8 Left and the arcwall machine in the return airway at it's junction with the No.6 Right.

The direction of travel of the explosion indicated that the place of ignition had probably occurred in the No.8 Left and this was supported by the fact that the cable adapter box was found separate from the master control box of the Joy loader. The box had been mounted to the control box by means of a flange and spigot machined joint held by four fixing screws and a strengthening bracket, but none of the studs were found in position. Two of them had been broken for some time and the spigot joint was opened to create a crescent shaped gap in the side of the control unit. The interior of the control box was in a very dry condition and contained a quantity of coal dust and many small pieces of coal. This indicated that there had been open access to the inside switch contacts for some time before the explosion. Tests were carried out and showed that this gap could pass the flame to an inflammable mixture.

An assistant electrician, who had started work at the colliery when he was 14 years of age, gave evidence to the repairs carried out on the Joy loader machines as did the Shift Foreman Electrical.

The inquiry concluded that:-
a) "The explosion had travelled along all the working places and roads which were near the faces
b) It was principally one of firedamp and there was little if any propagation of coal dust
c) A falling barometer had probably brought about some encroachment of firedamp back in the goaf, and some disturbance of a ventilation brattice or canvas sheet was sufficient to enable firedamp to enter No.8 Left where it was ignited at the master control box of the Joy loader and burned back into the goaf until it reached explosive range and there developed violence which swept from the goaf into the return airway."

The inquiry concluded that-
a) "The explosion had travelled all the working places and roads which were near the faces
b) It was principally one of firedamp and there was little if any propagation of coal dust
c) A falling barometer had probably brought about some encroachment of firedamp back in the goaf, and some disturbance of a ventilation brattice or canvas sheet was sufficient to enable firedamp to enter No.8 Left where it was ignited at the master control box of the Joy loader and burned back into the goaf until it reached explosive range and there developed violence which swept from the goaf into the return airway."

The official Report finished with the following conclusion:-
"It is proper to record here that, following this explosion, the National Coal Board have reverted to hand hewing and loading at the face of the 'brokens' workings for the time being. They have decided to veto the use of shuttle cars in 'brokens' or retreating longwall faces in future and to accept a broad interpretation of the General Regulation 132 until such time as amending electrical regulations come into force.

Meanwhile they will adopt as a long-term policy the modification of the foreign apparatus now installed in their mines to our flameproof standards. They have also effected a considerable improved design of adopter for the main entry cable on Joy loader machines and a raised standard of supervision of the electrical apparatus, especially that employed on the coal face."

Ian Winstanley