The first indication that there was anything wrong underground was a telephone message received at the surface by William Stewart from Thomas Martin, who was to be the only survivor of the men in Kelly's Section. At the Fatal Accident Inquiry, he stated that eight brushers, the fireman Joseph Campbell and he were sitting in Stark's Bench about 10 a.m. eating their food when they noticed a 'haze, a trace of reek'. One of the brushers, Joseph M. Kelly, went down the brae and returned to say that he thought it was the reek of some shots that had been fired in Archinvole's Section. The reek died away.

After piece time, the fireman went down to the foot of the hutches which was 380 yards from the site of the fire, while Martin worked the brake at Smart's Bench. Thomas Martin said that on returning about 11 a.m., the fireman said that he had found nothing wrong. The fireman stayed with Thomas Martin and Joseph M. Kelly, who were erecting steel arches near the face of the main heading.

About 11.20 the reek was again noticed but this time it continued. About 11.55 a.m. Thomas Martin, after informing the fireman of his intention, went out to see what was wrong. He found smoke in the intake as he got below Smart's bench. The smoke got worse on the side haulage road and he found it very thick at the bottom of Waddell's Brae. He reached the doors in the air crossing leading to the return only with difficulty.

Here he found the smoke less dense along the main return and he reached the bottom of the pit safely. As was no pit bottomer, Thomas Martin telephoned William Stewart, the lampman at the surface. He also spoke to William Patrick and James Wilson.

Thomas Martin then went inbye along the main haulage road to beyond the 'Circle' where he met the two electricians, Wilson and Patrick, about 12.20 p.m. The three men then returned to the ' Circle' where William Patrick opened the switch to cut off the current from the side haulage road. He then travelled inbye where he found a fire 100 yards beyond the partly built undercast at Paterson's Road. The fire was on both sides of the road but was greater on the side where the cable ran. The surface attendants were informed by telephone.

James Wilson noticed about half a hutch of stone had fallen on the right hand side at the outbye end of the fire. The road was supported by steel arches 9 feet wide and 6 feet high with a large amount of wood lagging behind. Some of this was old railway wagon sides. There were also several wooden building chocks behind the arches. The road was an old longwall waste. A few bags of stone dust and some sand and cement provided for the construction of the overcast were thrown on the fire.

Robert Buchanan, the oversman in the No.2 Pit, was at the winding level at the Cloven Coal in the No.2 Pit about 1.55 a.m. when he noticed smoke coming up the shaft which was evidently coming from the Coking Coal. He went to the surface and after getting the shaftsman, William Whyte, and his assistant who were examining the No.1 shaft, they went down the No.1 Pit. They looked into the return, found smoke and telephoned inbye to Archinvole's Section where they learnt from Thomas McDermott that all was clear in his section. A little later, they got in touch with James Wilson at Paterson's Road when they knew the position of the fire. They telephoned the surface and went inbye again contacting the surface at 12.45 p.m. and shortly after they contacted William McAlpine, the Agent.

Robert Buchanan, with the consent of the agent, arranged for two wooden doors on Paterson's Road between the intake and the return to be opened so as to reduce the amount of air travelling past the fire. When William McAlpine received the message at 1 p.m., he went at once into the mine and contacted the Coatbridge Rescue Station and Mr. Arthur Stoker, Senior Inspector of Mines. Arrangements were made for a supply of fire extinguishers which were quickly obtained. About 50 to 60 men were organised to carry them in to the mine and return the empty cases. Hundreds of extinguishers, including refills, were delivered at the site of the fire which was gradually brought under control but it spread inbye and at about 7 p.m. the lagging over the let side of the road, about 10 yards outbye from the original seat of the fire, burned through and a large amount of debris ran from the roof which hindered the operations.

Eventually water was piped to the fire which was finally put out about 3.30 a.m. on the following morning, about 15 hours after it was discovered. The fire had spread inbye 17 to 18 yards from the point where it was first seen and none of the steel arches were displaced.

The cable was found to be severed at the original seat of the fire, at the outer end of the junction box where the smaller cable was joined to the larger one. The junction box had slipped from the horizontal position about 4 feet above the pavement and was lying touching a heap of dirt. The end of the cable was lying underneath the heap of dirt which had obviously fallen from the side of the road. The switch at the 'Cable' was examined and the fuse was found to be intact.

The Rescue Brigade set up a fresh air station close to the return airway at the top of Paterson's Road at 2.10 p.m. The return was explored inbye but the smoke was so thick the team could not travel far. Messrs. Arthur Stoker, Senior Inspector and George Hoyle Junior Inspector of Mines held a consultation to decide what was to be down. The reversal of the ventilation was impracticable due to the length of time it would take to get the men out of the No.2 Pit and all efforts to fight the fire would have to be stopped. There was also a risk of firedamp being carried to the fire.

The position of the imprisoned men was not known. There would have been three possibilities for them. The first to come out of the intake, up Waddell's Brae and through the doors into the return, the same way they usually travelled. Second, to come out by Kelly's Return, the shorter distance and finally to erect screens and doors to short circuit the smoke and try and maintain themselves in some part of the section in fresh air.

Two more teams from Coatbridge had been summoned and a number of trained men from local collieries were called in. Another attempt was made at 4.45 p.m. to get along the return with instructions to go down Waddell's Brae and along the side haulage road to the foot of Kelly's Brae. They reached the air crossing but found the Brae full of smoke. The visibility was poor and the air very hot so that they could not proceed further.

They opened the doors at the air crossing which allowed the smoke from the Brae to short circuit into the return. A third attempt was made when the smoke decreased and this party was able to reach a point along the level length of Kelly's Return, about 50 yards inbye of the junction with Waddell's Return. A fourth, unsuccessful attempt was then made. At the fifth attempt, Waddell's Brae was still found to be impassable and the team travelled 1,350 yards to and from the base to reached point of Kelly's Return about 35 yards from Kelly's Brae. Here the road was considered to be too constricted for men with apparatus to travel and the time for the first half of the journey had expired.