The Explosion
Immediately after this Hunt started the other fan and he and Barke, the electrician, followed Whitehouse into the level. A few minutes after, not longer than a quarter of an hour, the explosion occurred. The blast came outbye from the direction of the relocated fan and it was later discovered that the explosion had taken place somewhere in the neighbourhood of 87’s or 90’s gate.

News of the disaster reached Mr. Mottram, the Inspector by telephone but as he was ill in bed, Mr. H.A. Abbott, the Senior Inspector but later Divisional Inspector for the Midland and Southern Division went to the pit with all possible haste, descended and helped with the rescue operations. Meanwhile rescue teams arrived from various stations and with the aid of the officials and the men on the spot and the assistance of local managers and miners’ agents, everything was done to recover the bodies and attending the injured. The conduct of these men was highly commended in the report.

The men who died were:-

• Samuel Barke aged 25 years, electrician,
• Eli Hunt aged 35 years, assistant electrician,
• Elisha Whitehouse aged 52 years, deputy,
• James Taylor aged 31 years, stallman
• John Chappell aged 26 years, stallman
• George Randell aged 31 years, stallman.

Those who were injured:-

• Frank Hallam aged 34 years, stallman,
• William Clark aged 43 years, ripper,
• Steven Barlow aged 29 years, roadlayer,
• George Stones aged 34 years, roadlayer
• William Brailsford aged 29 years, ripper and timberer
• Thomas Longden aged 42 years, overman who suffered from carbon monoxide poisoning during the rescue operations.

A thorough inspection of the day of the explosion was impossible because of inflammable gas and afterdamp but on the 8th April a thorough inspection was carried out by Mr. Nelson, H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines and Mr. Abbott. The region of the explosion was found to have been confined to the inner half of the level and a few of the gates branching off it. The force of the explosion was found it was outbye of 87’s gate bottom but in 87’s till 90’s gate where it was inbye. The force was noticed up the gates towards the coal face in the gates from 90’s back to 84’s. In 83’s there were distinct indications of force both ways.

It was considered that coal dust had played very little part, if any, on the explosion and inquiries were directed to consider the possible sources of ignition. No blasting had been done and all the lamps were found to be in good order and these sources were eliminated. As electrical apparatus was installed between 88’s and 91’s, special attention was directed to see whether this was the source of ignition of the firedamp which apparently had accumulated in the level.

The first inspection was made by Mr. Nelson accompanied by the manager, Mr. Percy, Messrs. Hall and Lee of the Miners’ Association, the managers of several local collieries and some others. Mr. Nelson described what he found at the inquest-
“I went down the engine plane and then along the level and the first thing we saw was the site of the smaller fan before it had been removed from 25’s. We went further and saw the larger fan in its present position at the bottom of 28’s. We went a little further to the bottom of 81’s gate, and then Mr. Brailsford, the undermanager, went on with a canary in order to test the quality of the air with a lamp, and it was reported that there was gas present. After Messrs. Brailsford, Percy and Abbott had gone forward and the air reported sufficiently cleared, the whole party advanced with electric lamps.

We saw the indications of force. My chief mission was to inspect the electrical apparatus and to offer an opinion as to its condition, or as to whether sparking had occurred. I got to the switch which operated the fan between 90’s and 91’s and was told it was there for me to examine. I gathered that no one had disturbed it since the rescue men had brought away the bodies of Hunt and his mates. I found that the switch handle was partly in and partly out. Further, that the switch cover was not properly fastened down. I drew attention to these points and then with the concurrence of everybody I opened the switch box. It was then seen, I was in the best position to see, that the switch was making contact in part, and in part only. This is a 3-phase system and there were three blades in each switch. Two of these three blades were making contact but the third was not making contact. This was clear, it indicated to me that the switch might have been in the course of being operated. If the switch had been in the process of closing or opening, there would have been sparks and the fact that the switch cover was not properly fastened down would make that spark open to the outside air. Such a spark would ignite and explode the mixture. The cover should have been bolted down but this may have been due to the fact that the job was not finished. Another point is where the cables led to the switch box, there were three holes which were five eighths of an inch, only leaving one eighth or so around the cable. I left the pit with the impression that there might well have been some opening at that spot.

I paid a subsequent visit to the pit on the 19th April after additional electrical apparatus had been found in the heading and on this second occasion I was shown a switch in 87’s gate. What I saw there absolutely convinced me that there had been a fall of stone on the switch and that that fall of stone had occurred when the switch was live. This was clear from the fact that the terminals inside the switch box was clearly fused and the cover which had been forced on top of them had corresponding points which showed that it had been forced on top of the live terminals. My evidence is that whatever happened at the fan, quite certainly there was an open spark here which would have ignited gas if gas had been present.”
When the dirt had been cleared away, three bare leads were found, probably from the former connection to the fan.
Mr. Nelson thought that if they were live they could have made a spark when they came into contact with the ground. The explosion originated about this point but it was thought it would have been incredibly careless for an electrician to start the fan in the condition in which he found it and he was prepared to believe that Hunt and Barke had not made such a grave error.

The inquest was conducted by Mr. M.S. Brodhurst, Deputy Coroner for the Hundred of Scarsdale at the Oxcroft Colliery Institute, near Clowne on the 29th April and continued until the 12th May. Several points were exposed at the inquest. The manager was not aware that the small auxiliary fan was being removed on the day of the explosion. The arrangements had been made by the undermanager who was absent from the colliery for the day and in these circumstances the undermanager ought to have seen that the manager knew of the arrangements that had been made.
The usual weekday practice of the deputy descending the pit and inspecting the workings and reporting the result at the Station before allowing the men to pass that point was not carried out on a Sunday. This was a breach of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, Section 63 and of the General Regulation 50.

In the event of a fall of roof in any of the stalls, the ventilation was interrupted throughout the district through the want of a counter head or crossgates to act as a return airway. The manager, Mr. Percy, had not long held the post gave evidence to show that previous to the explosion he had made arrangements to extend the crossgates further outbye. It would have been better to have preserved the counterhead when it was driven in the solid, or to have formed a new one through the waste at an earlier date. Had this been done the use of the auxiliary fans in the Level would not have been necessary.

The men moving and installing the fan were working entirely with electric lamps. It was said that this was because they gave a better light. It was not easy to explain why the deputy, who, after ascertaining that the ventilation had been off for some time in the Level through the closing of a door and the stopping of the fan, should leave his safety lamp and go into a place that was liable to contain firedamp with just an electric lamp.

It was found that certain electrical sub-circuits used for cutting coal and the auxiliary fans were taken off by smaller cables in the level. There was no protection for these smaller circuits. Mr. Nelson stated that fuses would have prevented the disaster. The absence of such protection measures was a contravention of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 1911.

After the jury had deliberated for three quarters of an hour they returned the following unanimous verdict-
“1. That Whitehouse was killed between 84’s and 85’s gates from the force of the explosion Hunt, Chappell and Randell from CO poisoning in the Level at 90’s gate Taylor in the Level between 28’s and 29’s gates and Barke at the coal face in 28’s stall both from the force of the explosion caused by an electric spark igniting gas which had accumulated in the district, but we are unable to fix the definite point of origin, but the probability is that it occurred in the switch box in 87’s gate.
2. The jury are of the opinion that the Coal Mines Regulation Act should be strictly adhered to on Sundays as well as other days. We also think that all switch boxes should be inset, and we are also of the opinion that the crossgates should be completed as soon as possible and thus obviate the necessity of using auxiliary fans. We are unable to fix the blame on anyone.”

As a result of the investigation proceedings were taken against the following officials of the mine,
Mr. George Anderson, Agent, Mr. Robert M. Percy, manager and Mr. James Brailsford, undermanager for violations of the Coal Mines Regulation Act.

The cases were heard at the County Court in Chesterfield but no convictions were obtained.
After the disaster the electrical apparatus at the colliery was improved to include subcircuits.
Counter heads and crossgates to act as independent return air courses, were constructed and the use of auxiliary fans discontinued. Additional air doors were provided in the gates to conduct a larger quantity of air to the inbye workings.