Auchengeigh
- The Inquiry -

The inquiry into the causes and circumstances attending the underground fire which occurred at Auchengeich Colliery, Lanarkshire, on 18th, September 1959 was conducted by T.A. Rogers, C.B.E., H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines and Quarries at the Justicary Court, Glasgow on the 4th January 1960 and sat for ten days until the 15th January. The final report was presented to The Right Honourable Richard Wood, M.P., Minister of Fuel and Power in May 1960.

The inquiry heard evidence from eighty five witnesses and all interested parties were represented. The following conclusions were reached:-

“1). The fire originated in the balata transmission belt of the electrically driven fan in the return airway from the No. 2 Pit workings. The fire was caused by frictional heat generated between the rotating motor pulley and the belt, which had left the fan pulley and jammed near it. Flame from the belt ignited the oil vaporised from the fan shaft bearings and oily deposits in and around the fan. The flame then spread downwind to ignite roadway timbers.

2). By tragic coincidence, forty eight men riding through the return airway were overtaken by smoke containing carbon monoxide and forty seven of these men were asphyxiated.

3). The fire would not have reached dipterous proportions had inflammable material been excluded from a substantial length of roadway immediately adjacent to and on the return side of the fan.

4). The haze which proceeded the smoke was not recognised, either by officials or by workmen, as a sign of imminent danger. By the time the fire was found the second man-riding train had already left the pit bottom.

5). Fire fighting arrangements were inadequate but the deficiencies did not contribute to the loss of life.

6). The fire would probably have been averted had the fan been under continuous supervision. It might have been averted or its development halted had the fan been inspected at half hourly intervals prescribed as a maximum by Regulation.

7). Closer examination of the belt performance after speeding up the fan might have indicated the advisability of reverting to the previous speed or altering the drive.

8). The unsatisfactory performance of the belt and the damage done to it in the two days before the fire, particularly the night immediately before, received insufficient attention.

9). By calculation, a balata transmission belt made of 33.3 oz. cotton dick put on after the speed-up of the fan had an excess capacity of about 50 per cent and a 31 oz. belt caught fire about 25 per cent. But the first of these belts lasted less than two weeks and the other only two days.

10). The belt which caught fire was not the 33.3 oz. weight ordered by the National Coal Board and failed to satisfy completely some of the tests prescribed by the British Standard 2066.”

The Inquiry made the following recommendations following the disaster:-

“1) Underground booster fans driven by inflammable belts should be constantly attended by competent and properly instructed persons.

2) The bearings of underground fans should be lubricated with grease or any suitable non-inflammable lubricant that may be developed.

3). All power transmission belts used at collieries should be made of fire resistant material. Pending the introduction of fire resistant flat belting, managers should make effective arrangements to ensure that any over-heating or fire in machinery, driven by an inflammable belt, will be discovered and dealt with before serious danger can develop.

4). All managers should carry out thorough reviews of their fire fighting arrangements to ensure that sufficient appliances in proper working order will be available for prompt use in any place where fire may break out underground. These reviews should include consideration of telephone systems and means of warning men of fire.

5). All managers should have made thorough examinations made of the whole of their pits to identify any places on unusually high fire risk and determine what can be done to minimise the risk at each of these places and to deal with any fire which might occur.

6). The attention of all officials should be drawn specifically to their obligation under Regulation 11 (1) of the Coal and Other Mines (Fire and Rescue) Regulations, 1956, that men must be withdrawn as soon as there in any indication that fire has, or may have, broken out below ground.

7). The industry should reconsider it’s decision to discontinue the trials of self Rescuers.

8). There should be a suitably constituted standing committee of experts, representing all sides of the Industry and the Ministry of Power, charged with the task of keeping under close and constant review the prevention of explosions and fires in mines, with particular reference to the lessons of actual fires and explosion in this country and abroad, and of anticipating any possible ignition hazards arising or likely to arise from new developments in mining practice.”

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Charles Sharkey
Rescue Brigadesman